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From Idiots and Lunatics to 
Incapacitated Persons and 
Respondents: The Evolution of 
Guardianship Law in Rhode Island 
Mark B. Heffner*  
INTRODUCTION 
When its iconic “1984” commercial aired in the third quarter 
of the 1984 Super Bowl game, Apple announced the availability of 
the first Macintosh computer.  With its graphical user interface 
replacing the “glowing greenish phosphor”1 and “surly c:\˃  
prompts”2 of the IBM P.C. launched three years earlier, the first 
“Mac” introduced the intuitive user interface, which we now take 
for granted. 
At the same time a Rhode Islander might be opening his 
shiny new Mac, another Rhode Islander who was classified as an 
“idiot, lunatic, or person of unsound mind” could be stripped of her 
 
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.  B.A., 
Harvard College; J.D., Boston College Law School. Certified Elder Law 
Attorney and Principal, Heffner & Associates.  The tenacious research of Erin 
Paquette, former star student in the author’s Elder Law courses and previous 
member of this Law Review, contributed substantially to this article.  
Kathleen A. Sherlock, Supervising Attorney of the Rhode Island Disability 
Law Center, provided important insights into her work as the chair of the 
subcommittee of the Guardianship Commission responsible for producing the 
1992 guardianship reform act.  Raquel M. Ortiz, Assistant Dean for Library 
and Information Services, generously helped to track down difficult-to-locate 
previous iterations of the guardianship statute enacted by the Rhode Island 
General Assembly.  
 1.  WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 95 (Simon & Schuster 2011). 
 2.  WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS 363 (Simon & Schuster 2014). 
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personal autonomy.  Rhode Island law would have afforded a 
probate court no statutory standards to decide whether an 
individual would fall into one of these classifications—or others 
such as “a habitual drunkard”—which might cause a probate court 
to appoint a guardian for her.  Apart from required personal 
service, the person who found herself on the wrong end of a 
guardianship proceeding was afforded no clear procedural rights, 
including evidentiary standards or right to counsel, under Rhode 
Island’s guardianship statutes. 
As this article will describe, the guardianship law in Rhode 
Island existing in 1984 was essentially the same that had existed 
since 1905.  And the 1905 statutes represented only a modest 
modernization of Rhode Island’s guardianship laws that had 
existed since its colonial era.  It would take until 1985—and more 
fully not until 1992—before the breakthrough of the woman 
throwing a hammer through glass, literally depicted in Apple’s 
“1984” commercial, would figuratively occur in Rhode Island’s 
guardianship laws. 
This article will first examine Rhode Island’s guardianship 
laws during the more than 200 years from Rhode Island’s colonial 
era until 1985, and label this time as the “Dark Period.”  In the 
next sections, entitled “First Light” and the “Dawn,” this Article 
will discuss how, after this over 200 year period of relative 
dormancy, Rhode Island’s guardianship evolved rapidly over the 
comparatively short period between 1985 through 1996.  This 
article will conclude with a section entitled “After the Dawn,” 
which will examine what has occurred (and has not occurred) in 
the twenty years following this period of rapid change. 
Rhode Island’s guardianship laws and its changes will be 
viewed through the prism of two areas: the grounds for the 
initiation of a guardianship proceeding and the procedural rights 
of the individual for whom the guardianship is sought.  
Guardianships, of course, involve many other aspects and 
requirements; however, focusing on these two significant areas 
will provide most vivid insight to Rhode Island’s guardianship 
laws as they once existed and as they now are. 
To highlight this evolution, this article will focus on 
provisions of Rhode Island’s statutes pertaining to guardianship of 
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adults.3  For, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed out in 
Trustees of House of the Angel Guardian, Boston v. Donovan, “in 
this state the probate court derives its jurisdiction wholly from the 
statute.”4  Accordingly, this article will emphasize statutory 
provisions, discussing reported decisions of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court which interpret the enactments of the General 
Assembly. 
The terms used in this article for an individual for whom a 
guardianship is sought will correlate with the terms generally 
used by the statutes during the particular period discussed.  For 
example, during what this article will call the “Dark Period,” such 
an individual will be referred to as the “intended ward.”  
Similarly, in discussing this statute from the period labeled “First 
Light” onward, the term respondent will generally be used. 
Rather than utilizing the cumbersome “he or she,” the 
pronouns for gender will be dealt with in a manner also reflective 
of the time.  Because during the Dark Period guardians were 
generally male, the pronoun “he” will be used when referring to a 
guardian, with she used to represent the “intended ward.”  For the 
discussion of the period of the First Light onward, this convention 
will be reversed—i.e., the pronoun “she” will be used for the 
guardian with “he” referring to the respondent.  Exceptions to 
these conventions will obviously occur when referring to actual 
parties in a reported case. 
I. THE DARK PERIOD 1742–1984 
A. Grounds for Guardianship.   
As described by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 
Tillinghast v. Holbrook, “[i]n 1742, the General Assembly, for the 
first time, legislated upon the subject of the appointment of 
guardians over the persons or estates of persons other than 
 
 3.  Prior to Public Law 1992, Chapter 493, referred to later in this 
article as the “1992 Act” guardianships of minors and adults were dealt with 
in the same statute.  Section 5 of the 1992 Act created a new Chapter 15.1 of 
Title 33 dealing exclusively with guardianships of minors.  See R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 33-15.1-1-1—40 (2012).  Public Law 1946, Chapter 1711 created a new 
Chapter 16 of Title 33 dealing with veterans guardianships.  Both of these 
Chapters are outside the scope of this article.  See id. § 33-16-1—35  
 4.  46 A.2d 717, 718 (R.I. 1946). 
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infants.”5  The court explained that:  
The title of the act indicates its general purpose – “An act 
empowering several town councils of this colony to have 
the care and oversight of all persons who are delirious, 
distracted, or non compos mentis, and their estates.”  It 
enacts that “it shall be in the power of each town council 
in this government to take into their care all persons and 
their estates in each respective town, who are delirious, 
distracted, or non compos mentis, or such who, for want of 
discretion in managing their estates, are likely to bring 
themselves and their families to want in misery, and 
thereby render themselves and their families chargeable 
to the respective towns in which such persons live.” 6 
The Tillinghast court also noted that the power formally 
vested in the town councils and then in the “several courts of 
probate . . . suggest another motive, viz.; to save the towns from 
the burthen of supporting such persons after their estate shall be 
wasted away.”7 
In its 1822 Public Laws, the General Assembly refined the 
1742 phrase “the persons or estates of persons other than infants” 
to then empower “the courts of probate, in their respective 
towns . . . to approve of guardians chosen by minors of fourteen 
years of age and upward.”8  It also made this power more succinct 
and specific, namely “to appoint guardians of idiots, and all other 
persons who are non compos mentis or lunatic, or who for want in 
discretion in managing their estates are likely to bring themselves 
and families to want and thereby render themselves and families 
chargeable to such town.”9 
Thus, the General Assembly’s 1822 enactment replaced the 
terms “delirious and distracted” of its colonial era predecessor 
with the terms “idiot” and “lunatic.”10  The General Assembly, 
however, hit its full stride in its enactment of the 1844 Public 
Laws: 
 
 5.  7 R.I. 230, 248 (R.I. 1862). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 249. 
 8.  1822 R.I. Pub. Laws 245. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.   See id.  
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Whenever any idiot or lunatic, or person non-compos 
mentis, or any person who for want of discretion in 
managing his estate, shall be likely to bring himself and 
family to want, and thereby to render himself and family 
chargeable, shall reside or have a legal settlement in any 
town, the court of probate of such town shall have the 
right to appoint a guardian or person and estate of such 
person.11 
It is perhaps not surprising that an early or mid-nineteenth 
century General Assembly would classify someone as an “idiot or 
lunatic or person non-compos mentis,” and further use that 
characterization as the basis for subjecting such an individual to a 
guardianship.  It may be surprising, as this article will reveal, 
that these same classifications (with additions such as “habitual 
drunkard”) would persist with only minor phrasing changes for 
the next 142 years. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Jenckes v. Court of 
Probate of Smithfield, interpreting the General Assembly’s 1844 
enactment, drew a sharp distinction between the statutory phrase 
“idiot and lunatic and person non compos mentis” and an 
individual who may be subject to a guardianship based on “want 
of discretion in managing his estate.”12  Jenckes involved a will 
contest in which one of the allegations was that the will of 
Hannah Jenckes should be void because Ms. Jenckes was the 
subject of a guardianship at the time of the will’s execution.13 
The Jenckes court pointed out that “[t]he order of the Court of 
Probate states the testatrix was put under guardianship because 
she wanted discretion in the management of her estate.”14  The 
Court stated that “such a want of discretion does not imply that 
the party was not of a sane mind.  If the appointment had been 
from idiocy, lunacy, or because the person was non-compos mentis, 
the case would have been different.”15 
In interpreting Section 3 of An act respecting Guardians 
contained in the 1844 Public Laws, the Jenckes court asked: “Can 
it be reasonably supposed that the General Assembly intended to 
 
 11.  1844 R.I. Pub. Laws 272. 
 12.   2 R.I. 255 (R.I. 1852).  
 13.  Id. at 255–56.   
 14.   Id. at 258–59.  
 15.  Id. at 259. 
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place the last class of persons enumerated on the same footing 
with idiots, lunatics, or person non compos mentis in reference to 
their capacity to make a will?”16  Answering its own question in 
the negative, the court upheld the Smithfield Probate Court’s 
ruling admitting Ms. Jenckes will to probate, stating the 
following: 
The statute in relation to wills authorizes every person of 
sane mind to make a will, and is there any reason for 
saying that a person, who wants discretion in the 
management of his estate, and is likely to spend it, is not 
of sane mind?  It is not a want of discretion or judgment 
which disables; it is insanity.  The testator has a right to 
exercise his own discretion in judgment, and, if he is 
wanting in both, it does not affect the validity of his will if 
he be sane.  The argument makes want of discretion 
which shall subject a party to be put under guardianship 
equivalent to the want of sane mind.17 
The Jenckes court also reinforced the provisions of the statute 
that lack of discretion in managing an estate is not itself sufficient 
grounds for the appointment of a guardian.  Rather, the court 
stated that “the authority to appoint exists only, where the want 
of discretion is such that the party would be likely to bring himself 
and family to want and thereby become chargeable.”18  The lack of 
this element in Ms. Jenckes’ case made the Probate Court’s order 
of guardianship “obviously void.”19  Nevertheless, the court found 
this fact beside the point in its ruling, for even had it been 
present, Ms. Jenckes would have been not have been proven to 
lack the “sane mind” required to make a will.20 
In Hopkins v. Howard the court again held that “lacking in 
discretion in the management of her estate, is not enough to 
warrant the appointment of a guardian at the instance of the 
overseer of the poor of the town.  It must also appear that, by 
reason of such want of discretion, she is likely to become a public 
 
 16.  Id. at 257. 
 17.  Id. at 257–58. 
 18.  Id. at 259. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 257–58. 
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charge thereon as alleged in the petition.”21 
The court in Hopkins determined the decision to appoint a 
guardian as “fatally defective” on two grounds.22  First, it found 
that the alleged ward had sufficient assets to prevent her from 
becoming a charge on the town.23  For example, the court noted 
that:  
The proof as to respondent’s indiscretion in the managing 
of her estate consists mainly of the most ordinary, and in 
many cases the most trivial, expenditures such, for 
example, as spending all of the money she had at a given 
time (in many instances not more than 50 cents or a 
dollar) for sugar, tea, butter or some other article of 
everyday use in a family.24   
The court found that, despite numerous other instances of this 
type related in the evidence,  
[A]nd, while it appears that she is somewhat eccentric in 
some of her transactions, [] there is nothing to show that 
she is wasteful or extravagant, and no evidence that she 
is likely to become a public charge for want of discretion 
in managing her estate as to warrant the court placing 
her under guardianship.25 
In Gardella v. Gardella the court reiterated its interpretation 
of the need for a finding of both lack of discretion in managing 
financial affairs and the likelihood to become a public charge prior 
to the proper appointment of a guardian under the statute.26  In 
an interesting twist relevant in many present day proceedings, the 
Gardella court further found that the prospect of Mr. Gardella’s 
adult children providing “proof that their perspective inheritances 
may be lost” is not the same as the prospect of an individual 
becoming chargeable to the town.27  The Gardella court noted that 
“[t]he statute is not designed to permit adult children to curb the 
action of a parent of sound mind and legal discretion in the 
 
 21.  39 A. 519, 520 (R.I. 1898) (citation omitted).   
 22.  Id. at 519.  
 23.   Id. at 520. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.   146 A. 621 (R.I. 1929). 
 27.  Id. at 622. 
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disposition or management of his estate.  It seeks to protect a 
spendthrift, his legal dependents and the town for his folly.”28 
What then of the other grounds for guardianship stated in the 
statute—i.e., that the individual is purported “idiot or lunatic, or 
person non compos mentis”?  The statute contains no definition of 
any of these three terms.  A modern Rhode Island case notes that  
“[t]he 1623 James I act used the term ‘non compos mentis’—
literally ‘not master of one’s mind’—in describing what has 
evolved into the term ‘unsound mind’ used in § 9-1-19.”29  As it did 
in the statute of limitations provisions of section 9-1-19 cited by 
the Roe v. Gelineau court, the General Assembly replaced the term 
“non compos mentis” in the guardianship statutes with the phrase 
“person of unsound mind.”30 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decisions are equally 
unhelpful regarding the other terms used in the statute.  “The 
terms ‘lunatic, idiot or person of unsound mind,’ used in the 
statute in their natural and ordinary use, indicate a condition of 
mental disability and incapacity.”31  Looking outside of Rhode 
Island law for insight to the meaning of the terms “idiot and 
lunatic”: 
English common law distinguished between two types of 
individuals who suffer from mental incapacity: the idiot 
and the lunatic.  Crudely put, the lunatic was someone 
who once possessed a sound mind and somehow lost it; 
the idiot never had one.  The idiot’s condition was static.  
He came into the world with a certain deficient mental 
apparatus and generally left it in the same way.  For the 
idiot there are no past periods of competency to look back 
to, no future competency to hope for.  The lunatic, on the 
other hand, had once been competent and now 
experienced alternating periods of lunacy and lucidity.  
The very word ‘lunatic’ comes from the Latin ‘lunar’ or 
moon, and like the moon the insanity of the lunatic waxed 
and waned.  Even a lunatic who appeared permanently 
insane was presumed potentially curable.  He had once 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Roe v. Gelineau 794 A. 2d 476, 485 (R.I. 2002) (citations omitted). 
 30.  1882 R.I. PUB. LAWS 430. 
 31.  Champlin v. Probate Court of Exeter, 92 A. 982, 982 (R.I. 1915). 
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lived his life on equal mental footing with others, and 
there was always that glimmer of hope that he would do 
so again.32 
In addition to “want of discretion in managing his estate,” in 
1872 the General Assembly added to the list of potential 
candidates for guardianship to include “any person who from 
excess drinking, gaming, idleness, or debauchery of any kind” 
might “render himself or his family chargeable.”33 Apparently in 
order to emphasize that when it referred to excess drinking it 
meant it, the 1872 statutes added a new section authorizing that 
“[c]ourts of probate are hereby authorized to appoint guardians of 
the person and estates of individual drunkards”34 as well as the 
section authorizing “[t]he guardian of any habitual drunkard . . . 
to commit the ward to any curative hospital.”35 While the separate 
sections dealing with “habitual drunkards” and their potential 
commitment appeared again in the 1882 statutes,36 they 
disappeared with the enactment of the 1909 General Laws, which 
nevertheless retained the references to “habitual drunkard” and 
“excess drinking.” 37 
B. Conservators   
The Court Practices Act of 1905 introduced a new concept in a 
section entitled Conservators of the Property of Aged Persons, 
which provided as follows: 
If a person by reason of advanced age or mental weakness 
is unable to properly care for his property the probate 
court of the town in which he resides, upon his petition or 
the petition of one or more of his relatives or friends, may 
appoint a conservator of his property . . . [i]f at the 
hearing it appears that such person is incapable of 
properly caring for his property, a conservator shall be 
appointed, who shall have charge and management of the 
 
 32.  Louise Harmon, Failing Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine 
of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 1, 16 (1990).  
 33.  1872 R.I. PUB. LAWS. 336. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  1882 R.I. PUB. LAWS 430.  
 37.  33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 321-7 (1909). 
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property of such person subject to the direction of the 
court.38 
In enacting this section the legislature, therefore, introduced 
at the beginning of the twentieth century two concepts not 
previously existing in 18th or 19th century Rhode Island 
statutes—that is a proceeding in which the court would supervise 
the “charge and management of the property” of an individual 
based solely on “advanced age or mental weakness.”  Moreover, 
unlike the guardianship proceedings, such a conservatorship 
proceeding could be initiated upon the petition of the individual 
herself. 
If appointed, the statute also provided that “such conservator 
shall give bond and file inventory as is required of guardians of 
estates” and further that “[a]ll provisions of law relative to 
accounting and the management, investment, sale, lease or 
mortgage by guardians of estates shall apply to the accounting 
and to the management, investment, sale, lease or mortgage of 
estates by conservators.”39 
The General Assembly thus introduced an entirely new 
reason that someone might become subject to the supervision of 
the probate court—i.e., based solely on “advanced age or mental 
weakness,” without any requirement that that individual’s 
purported deficiencies would cause her to become a “charge” upon 
her town.  Moreover, the individual himself could determine that 
the supervision of the probate court was necessary and initiate 
this proceeding.40 This introduction of conservators became 
codified in Rhode Island General Laws 1909 Chapter 321 Sections 
37 and 38. 
In Whitmarsh v. McGair the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
noted that “[i]t is apparent from our statutes and the definition of 
the word ‘conservator’ and ‘guardian of the estate’ of a person are 
essentially synonymous.”41  At the same time the court noted the 
utility and the distinction between the petition for the 
appointment of a conservator and that for a guardian:  
 
 38.  Court and Practice Act of 1905 § 1077 (codified as amneded at R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 33-15-44 (2012)).   
 39.  Id. § 1078.   
 40.  These provisions regarding Conservators subsequently became 
codified in General Laws 1909 Chapter 321 § 37 and 38.   
 41.  156 A.2d 83, 87 (R.I. 1959). 
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A person may himself petition for the appointment of a 
conservator of his estate.  To elderly persons needing help 
in the care of their property, the word conservator 
appears to be less offensive and less suggestive of the loss 
of mentality than the word guardian, but the duties and 
responsibilities of conservator appear not to differ 
materially from those of a guardian of the estate.42 
Like the statute setting forth the basis for the appointment of 
a guardian, the statute allowing for the appointment of a 
conservator remained essentially unchanged from the time of its 
appearance in 1905 until 80 years later in 1985. 
C. Procedural Rights of the Intended Ward 
In its 1857 Revised Statutes, the General Assembly mandated 
that “every court of probate shall, before proceeding, give notice to 
all parties, known to be interested” in particular proposed actions 
by the probate court.43  Included among actions such as allowing 
or disallowing wills submitted for probate and accountings of 
fiduciaries was “the appointment of guardians of minors above 
fourteen years of age and all other persons other than minors.”44 
Like Monty Hall giving game show contestants a choice of doors 
number 1, 2 or 3, the legislature provided that such notice: 
[M]ay be given in either of the following modes, at the 
discretion of the court:—  
By causing a citation to be served by some sheriff, 
deputy sheriff, town sergeant or constable, upon all 
known parties interested at least seven days previous 
to proceeding; which citation shall give notice of the 
subject – matter of the proceeding, and the time and 
place thereof, and shall be served by reading the 
same to the parties, if to be found, or by leaving an 
attested copy thereof at the last and usual place of 
abode, of each of them; 
By advertisement of such notice for fourteen days 
once a week in some newspaper printed in the State; 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  1857 R.I. PUB. LAWS 353.  
 44.  Id. 
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By causing the clerk of the court to post up such 
notice in some conspicuous place in his office or at 
the place at which the court usually meets, and in 
one other public place within the town, at least 
fourteen days before proceeding.45 
In Angell v. Angell, the notice to the prospective ward “was by 
publication only.”46  It is not clear from the court’s decision 
whether “publication” meant newspaper advertisement or posting 
notice in the office of the clerk of the court; however from the 
context of the case the publication was most likely via newspaper 
advertisement.47  The Probate Court of the Town of North 
Providence appointed a guardian for Vashti Angell, despite the 
lack of personal service on Ms. Angell. 
Counsel for Ms. Angell contended that the statute itself “is 
unconstitutional because under it a person may be deprived of his 
liberty and property without due process of law by being put 
under guardianship without actual notice.”48  The Angell court 
was unmoved by Ms. Angell’s argument: 
Undoubtedly a personal notice to the intended ward 
would be better and more consonant with the usual 
course of judicial procedure than notice by publication 
only . . . but nevertheless our conclusion is that the 
appointment of the appellant was valid notwithstanding 
the want of personal notice to the appellee notice having 
been given as authorized by the statute.49 
In Hamilton v. Probate of North Providence the intended ward 
Gideon Hamilton appealed the action of the North Providence 
Probate Court appointing a guardian for him, alleging lack of 
sufficient notice of the pendency of the petition.50  The Court 
noted that “[t]he only notice given was by serving a citation on the 
intended ward, and by putting up a notice to all persons interested 
in the Town Clerk’s office . . . and [n]o notice was posted in any 
 
 45.  1857 R.I. PUB. LAWS 354.   
 46.  14 R.I. 541, 545 (R.I. 1864). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 546. 
 50.   9 R.I. 204 (R.I. 1869).   
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other place.”51  In dismissing Mr. Hamilton’s appeal for lack of 
notice, the Court stated that “[t]he Revised Statutes, chapter 152, 
prescribes the mode of notice in these cases, and this may be, 
either, 1st, by serving a citation on all known parties interested; 
2d, by advertisement in a newspaper; 3d, by causing the clerk of 
the court to post up such notice in some conspicuous place in his 
office, or in the place at which the court usually meets, and in one 
other public place, etc., etc.”52 
The Court found that while notice was served on the intended 
ward Mr. Hamilton, the other two options for notice were either 
absent or deficient.53  Rejecting Mr. Hamilton’s contention that 
despite personal service, notice was ineffective because his wife 
and his son were interested parties and were not notified, the 
Court found that the “citation served on the intended ward 
constituted sufficient legal notice.”54 
Until the enactment of the Court Practices Act of 1905, the 
legislature continued to afford the probate courts this menu of 
three notice options.  In its 1872 general statutes the General 
Assembly carved out yet a fourth option for “the appointment of 
the guardian of any inmate of any asylum for the insane.”55  The 
statute directed the process server to:  
[A]pply to the physician in charge of the asylum where 
the person upon whom the notice to be served is confined; 
and if said physician shall return, upon oath, on the back 
of such notice that in his opinion it would be injurious to 
the mental health of such person to have such notice 
served upon such person, the officer or person charged 
with the service of said notice shall leave a copy thereof, 
with physician’s return thereon with the keeper of said 
insane asylum and shall return said notice to the court 
which issued the same without further service.56 
Thus, if the intended ward were an “inmate of any asylum for 
the insane,” it is possible, and even likely, that she would have 
 
 51.  Id. at 205.   
 52.  Id. (alteration in orginal).  
 53.   Id.  
 54.  Id. 
 55.  1872 R.I. PUB. LAWS 370. 
 56.  1872 R.I. PUB. LAWS 371.   
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received no notice whatever that she was the subject of a pending 
guardianship petition.  For a process server would have certainly 
found it easier to get the physician to “sign off” on the notice 
rather serving it on the intended ward.  Similarly, physicians in 
charge of such institutions would likely have agreed to avoid 
actual notice on the individual purportedly for her own benefit 
and to avoid the intrusion of process server within the facility.  
This potential—indeed likelihood—that certain individuals could 
be subjected to guardianships without any notice continued 
unchanged until the 1992 Act. 
The Court Practices Act of 1905, for the first time, specifically 
required that “[n]o person shall be appointed guardian of the 
person of another, unless notice of the application for such 
appointment has been served upon the intended ward in person at 
least fourteen days prior to any action on said application . . . .”57  
The Court Practices Act of 1905, however, continued to provide an 
exception to this personal service requirement in the instance 
when “application shall be made to a probate court for the 
appointment of a guardian of any person confined to an asylum for 
the insane.”58  This revision of the Court and Practices Act of 1905 
was codified in the Rhode Island General Laws beginning in 
1909.59 
The Court Practices Act of 1905 continued the “appointment 
or approval of a guardian” as among the actions delineated for 
which a probate court was required to give notice before 
proceeding,60 specifying, however, that it “shall be given by 
advertisement of a notice for fourteen days, once a week, at least, 
in such newspaper, printed in English and published in the county 
in which the matter is to be acted upon, as the probate court by 
general rule or special order may designate for that purpose.”61  In 
addition to making this notice by newspaper advertising 
mandatory, the legislature in the Court and Practices Act of 1905 
also made more specific the previous requirement that the 
advertisement be published “in some newspaper published in the 
 
 57.  Court and Practice Act of 1905 ch. 50 § 1056.  
 58.  Id. ch. 38 § 1077. 
 59.  33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 321-16 (1909).  
 60.  Court and Practice Act of 1905 ch. 38 § 764.   
 61.  Id. § 769.   
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State.”62  This mandatory and more specific requirement of 
newspaper advertising by the Court was also codified in the 
General Laws revision of 1909.63 
In 1982 the General Assembly belatedly addressed the 
objections made by the appellant Mr. Hamilton 113 years 
earlier,64 by enacting new section 17.1 of Chapter 15, Title 33 
entitled Notice to Children or Heirs-at-Law of Ward.65  
Specifically, the legislature provided that “[n]o petition for 
conservatorship or guardianship shall be heard and no person 
shall be appointed guardian or conservator of the person or estate 
of another unless notice of the application for such appointment 
together with notice of the date, time and place set for hearing has 
been given to the prospective ward’s children and/or heirs at 
law.66  The 1982 version of this statute required that “[n]otice 
shall be given by registered mail, return receipt requested to the 
prospective ward’s children at their last known address, or if there 
be no children, then to the prospective ward’s heirs-at-law.”67 
In 1983 the legislature tempered its enthusiasm for the extent 
of this notice by deleting the requirement of notice to children and 
heirs-at-law by registered mail return receipt requested instead 
allowing such notice to be given by “regular mail, postage 
prepaid.”68  However, perhaps an exchange for this downgrading 
in the type of mailing, the legislature added that this notice be 
given “at least ten (10) days before the date set forth for hearing 
on said petition . . . .”69  In this same enactment, the legislature 
also required that this ten-day mail notice be given to the 
prospective ward’s spouse.70  In 1987, the General Assembly 
clarified the meaning of “heirs-at-law” in the statute, by specify 
individuals “who would inherit the prospective ward’s estate 
pursuant to the terms of Section 33-1-1.”71 
In addition to providing no definitions of ‘idiot, lunatic, or 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  32 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 309-5 (1909).  
 64.  See Hamilton v. Probate of North Providence, 9 R.I. 204 (R.I. 1869). 
 65.  1982 R.I. Pub. Laws 1262. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  1983 R.I. PUB. LAWS 374. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  1987 R.I. PUB. LAWS 171.  
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person of unsound mind’ (the term formerly known as non compos 
mentis) the Rhode Island guardianship statutes provided no 
standard for a court to determine how to determine whether an 
intended ward met these classifications. For example, was 
documentary evidence or oral testimony from the intended ward’s 
physician required?  What other evidence was needed to persuade 
a probate court that the individual was an “idiot, lunatic or person 
of unsound mind?”  The reported decisions of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court did not reference the types of evidence that was 
necessary to put an intended ward under guardianship. 
Similarly, neither the guardianship statutes nor the reported 
cases provide any insight to the evidentiary standards to be 
applied. Specifically, did the probate courts in assessing the 
evidence before it apply a preponderance of the evidence or a clear 
and convincing standard? 
Moreover, once a guardian had been appointed, there was no 
statutory mechanism for the then ward to terminate or modify the 
terms of the guardianship to which she was subjected.  Beginning 
with the 1857 revised statute, the General Assembly provided a 
mechanism for a court to remove a guardian “who by reason of 
absence, sickness, insanity or other cause, shall become incapable 
of executing his trust, or who shall neglect or refuse to do the 
duties thereof, or who shall waste of estate of his ward.”72  While 
this provision for the removal of the guardian remained nearly 
entirely unaltered until the 1992 Act, there existed nowhere prior 
to the 1992 Act for any mechanism for the termination or 
modification of the guardianship itself. 
II. FIRST LIGHT 1985–1988 
In 1985, the General Assembly altered the grounds by which 
a probate court could appoint a guardian.  These changes were 
both substantive and cosmetic.  Gone were the grounds based on 
an individual’s purported status as an “idiot, lunatic, or person of 
unsound mind.”  Gone also was the ability of a probate court to 
appoint a guardian based on categories of purported behavior (e.g., 
“excess drinking, gaming, idleness or debauchery”). Also 
eliminated was a potential guardianship based on “want of 
 
 72.  Revised Statutes of the State of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations, 1857, Ch. 152, Sec. 11. 
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discretion in managing his estate” which might lead to the 
individual or his family being public charges. 
Inserted in place was a functional standard.  Specifically, 
probate courts could now appoint guardians for an individual “who 
is unable to manage his or her estate and is unable to provide for 
his or her personal help and safety as a result of mental/or 
physical disability.”73  Specifically, such “mental or physical 
disability as determined by the court on the basis of oral or 
written evidence under oath from a qualified physician.”74 
On the cosmetic side, the legislation replaced the phrase 
“mental weakness” with “mental disability” for the grounds of the 
probate court to appoint a conservator.75  Likewise the description 
of “an asylum for insane” was replaced by “medical facility.”76 
The 1985 legislature’s elimination of the potential 
appointment of a guardian based merely on an individual’s 
purported status (idiot, lunatic, habitual drunkard, etc.) with a 
functional standards (unable to manage his or her estate or his or 
her personal health and safety) provided a glimmer of light to the 
dark, anachronistic standards which had stood for in Rhode 
Island’s guardianship statutes since the early to mid-19th century.  
As did providing an actual evidentiary basis (oral of written 
evidence under oath from a qualified physician) that the 
individual’s “mental and/or physical disability” rose to the level 
which would warrant the appointment of a guardian by the 
probate court. 
In practice, however, such light proved in some ways a false 
dawn.  For in practice it is now meant that petitioners needed only 
produce a one sentence letter from any “qualified physician.”  And 
such a “qualified physician” could have had the briefest of 
encounters with the intended ward in order to meet this 
requirement. 
Before 1986 probate courts had the ability to appoint 
guardians “of the person and estate, or of the person or estate” of 
an individual.77  The statute provided for no nuance or tailoring of 
the terms of the guardianship to meet the particular needs of an 
 
 73.  1985 R.I. PUB. LAWS 260.  
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 261. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  1986 R.I. PUB. LAWS 264.  
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individual.  This changed with Public Law 1986, Chapter 176 by 
the insertion of the following two paragraphs to [General Laws 
section to which inserted]: 
Within its powers under this chapter the probate court 
may limit the scope of the powers and duties of a 
guardian to the terms best suited to assist the ward in 
handling some but not all of his or her affairs, and may 
structure such guardianship to properly assist the ward 
in those areas where the ward may lack decision making 
ability. 
The certificate of appointment issued to said guardian 
shall clearly state that it is a limited guardianship.78 
For the first time, therefore, the guardianship statute 
permitted a court to move beyond the “one size fits all” 
appointment of a guardian of a person and of her estate.  The 1986 
legislation also introduced the notion of an individual’s “decision 
making ability”—the lynchpin to the more significant reforms of 
the statute to come shortly. 
In 1987 the General Assembly further modified the statute 
enabling probate courts to appoint conservators.79  The changes, 
though seemingly superficial, were actually substantive.  
Specifically, previously an individual seeking the appointment of a 
conservator was required to be of “advanced age” or have a 
“mental disability.”  The 1987 legislation eliminated the adjective 
“mental” before disability as well as the requirement of “advanced 
age” in order to initiate a conservatorship.  Accordingly, an 
individual could seek the appointment of a conservator based on 
his or her own “disability” alone. 80 
While the General Assembly was providing some light on the 
horizon with these revisions to the guardianship statutes, 
nationally the dawn was beginning to break.  The catalyst was a 
series of articles which appeared in 1987 produced by the 
Associated Press (“AP”) which resulted from a national study of 
state guardianship proceedings.81  The AP’s report entitled 
 
 78.  Id.   
 79.  See 1987 R.I. PUB. LAWS 290. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  ROBERT B. FLEMING & LISA NACHMIAS DAVIS, ELDER LAW ANSWER 
BOOK 11-3 (3d ed. 2013); see Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardians of 
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“Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System,” highlighted both 
procedural and substantive problems in state court guardianship 
proceedings.82 
The AP report sparked the convening of the National 
Guardianship Symposium in July, 1988 at the Johnson 
Foundation’s Wingspread Conference Center.83  Participants in 
this program (hereinafter “Wingspread”) included probate judges, 
physicians, law professors, attorneys from elder advocacy agencies 
and private practice attorneys as well as diversity of other 
members, including a bioethicist and an anthropologist.84 
Wingspread produced thirty-one recommendations “intended 
to better safeguard the rights of adult disabled wards and 
proposed wards [and] . . . to provide for the wards’ needs while 
maximizing individual autonomy.”85 Among these 
recommendations were the following: 
 Encouraging alternatives to guardianship, such use of 
durable powers of attorney, and “more appropriate 
uses of guardianship.86 
 “Minimum [d]ue [p]rocess safeguards,” such as 
personal service on a respondent by “[a] court officer 
dressed in plain clothes and trained to communicate 
and interact with elderly and disabled persons,” right 
to counsel, and rights at the guardianship hearing, 
including to compel the attendance of and to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses and a “clear and 
convincing standard of proof.”87 
 A definition of incapacity focused on, among other 
elements, that “incapacity is a legal, not a medical, 
term,” that “incapacity may be partial or complete,” 
and that “age, eccentricity, poverty or medical 
 
the Elderly: An Ailing System Part I: Declared ‘Legally Dead’ by a Troubled 
System, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 19, 1987), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/ 
1987/Guardians-of-the-Elderly-An-Ailing-System-Part-I-Declared-Legally-
Dead-by-a-Troubled-System/id-1198f64bb05d9c1ec690035983c02f9f. 
 82.  RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARDIANSHIP SYMPOSIUM AND 
POLICY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, iii (A.B.A. 1989). 
 83.  Id. at iv. 
 84.  Id. at iv, 35–36. 
 85.  Id. at iv. 
 86.  Id. at 3. 
 87.  Id. at 9–10. 
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diagnosis alone should not be sufficient to justify a 
finding of incapacity.”88 
Courts “limit the scope of and tailor the guardianship order to 
the particular needs of the ward” and that the guardian 
periodically report to the court the guardian’s efforts to “maximize 
self-reliance, autonomy and independence” of the ward.89 
III. THE DAWN 1990-1996 
A. Guardianship Commission 
The real transformation in Rhode Island’s guardianship laws 
began with the approval in 1990 of House Bill 90-H 7925A entitled 
“Joint Resolution Creating a Special Legislative Commission to 
Study the Laws on Guardianship.” 
In addition to members of the Rhode Island House of 
Representatives and Rhode Island Senate, and the directors or 
their designees of various state agencies, this twenty-five-member 
commission (the “Guardianship Commission”) included a diverse 
number of stakeholders in legal issues involving the elderly and 
disabled, including a representatives of a senior citizens’ center, 
the National Gray Panthers Association, a mental health 
association, the American Association of Retired Persons, and the 
Rhode Island Council of Senior Citizens.90  Specifically mandated 
among the two members were to be two “physicians specializing in 
geriatrics.”91  There was also to be one probate judge, the chief 
judge or his designee of the Family Court and two attorneys.92  
Thus the Guardianship Commission, while tasked with reviewing 
Rhode Island’s guardianship laws, was designed not to be lawyer-
centric. 
B. The 1992 Act   
The Guardianship Commission’s work resulted in House Bill 
92-H 9792, which following its approval in July 1992, became 92 
Public Law 493 (the “1992 Act”).  The 1992 Act eliminated entire 
 
 88.  Id. at 15. 
 89.  Id. at 20. 
 90.  H.B. 90-H 7925A (R.I. 1990).  The author, in his then capacity as a 
State Representative, served on the Guardianship Commission. 
 91.  H.B. 90-H 7925A (R.I. 1990). 
 92.  Id. 
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sections of Chapter 15 of Title 33, replacing them with new 
provisions.  Of those provisions of Chapter 15 not deleted and 
replaced, the majority were revised. 
The intention of the legislature in enacting the 1992 Act was 
codified in new Section 1 of Chapter 15 Title 33:  
The legislature finds that adjudicating a person totally 
incapacitated and in need of a guardian deprives such 
person of all his or her civil and legal rights and that such 
deprivation may be unnecessary.  The legislature further 
finds that it is desirable to make available, the least 
restrictive form of guardianship to assist persons who are 
only partially incapable of caring for their needs.  
Recognizing that every individual has unique needs and 
differing abilities, the legislature declares that it is the 
purpose of this act to promote the public welfare by 
establishing a system that permits incapacitated persons 
to participate as fully as possible in all decisions affecting 
them; that assists such persons in meeting the essential 
requirements for their physical health and safety, in 
protecting their rights, in managing their financial 
resources, and developing or regaining their abilities to 
the maximum extent possible; and that accomplishes 
these objectives through providing, in each case, the form 
of assistance that least interferes with the legal capacity 
of a person to act in his or her own behalf.  This chapter 
shall be liberally construed to accomplish this purpose.93 
The lynchpin of the reforms of the 1992 Act was mandating 
use of a seventeen page “Functional Assessment Tool” (FAT), in 
place of the potentially one-paragraph physician’s letter as the 
basis for a probate court’s determination of whether or not an 
individual required guardianship.94  Gone was the potential that 
someone could be made the subject of a guardianship proceeding 
based merely on his alleged status as an “idiot, lunatic, person of 
unsound mind,” or as a “habitual drunkard.”  Instead, the 
individual’s functional abilities and “capacity to make decisions” 
would be determinative.95 
 
 93.  1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1976. 
 94.  Id. at 1978. 
 95.  Id. 
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New Section 4 of Chapter 15 of Title 33 provided in part that:  
[T]he court shall authorize the guardian to make 
decisions for the individual in only those areas where the 
court finds, based on the functional assessment, that the 
individual lacks the capacity to make decisions.  The 
court must strike a delicate balance between providing 
the protection and support necessary to assist the 
individual and preserving to the largest degree possible 
the liberty, property and privacy interests of the 
individual.96 
New Rhode Island General Laws Section 33-15-4(a) further 
stated that “[t]he court shall not appoint a guardian or limited 
guardian if the court finds that the needs of the proposed ward are 
being met or can be met by a less restrictive alternative or 
alternatives.”97  The mere existence of ostensibly less restrictive 
alternatives to guardianships such as durable powers of attorney 
and joint property arrangements, however, do not preclude the 
appointment by a court of a guardian.  Rather, such a less 
restrictive alternative must be an effective mechanism for 
alternative decision-making for the respondent. 
The 1992 Act incorporated into a revised Rhode Island 
General Laws Section 33-15-17.1 which enhanced the existing 
provisions pertaining to notice required to a respondent, as well as 
that to spouses, children or heirs.98  The 1992 Act also prescribed 
a particular form of, and manner in which, notice must be served 
on a respondent.  Specifically, it mandated that: 
This notice shall be in plain language, large type and 
shall include the time and place of the hearing, the 
possible loss of liberty if the petition is granted, and shall 
inform the respondent of his or her rights including: the 
court appointment of a guardian ad litem, the right to a 
hearing and to be present at the hearing to confront 
 
 96.  Id. at 1977. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-17.1(e) (West 2006); 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws 
1968.  The 1992 Act added the additional requirement that notice by mail be 
provided to “the administrator or any care and treatment facility where the 
respondent resides or receive primary services [and] . . . any current provider 
of primary support service and primary medical caregivers.”  § 33-15-17.1(e). 
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witnesses, present evidence, contest the petition, object to 
the appointment of a particular individual as guardian, 
request that limits be placed on the guardian’s powers, 
and the right to counsel.99 
In addition, “[t]he court officer that serves this notice shall be 
dressed in plain clothes” and “[h]e or she shall have experience 
dealing with individuals who may lack decision making ability.”100  
Further, the 1992 Act added the requirement that the process 
server both present and read the notice to the respondent.101 
In addition to enhanced notice requirements, other previously 
unaddressed aspects of due process for respondents were explicitly 
addressed in the 1992 Act.  Specifically, a new section, entitled 
“Hearing,” first made clear that “[n]o limited guardian or guardian 
shall be appointed until after a hearing on the petition.”102  This 
section also required that “[t]he respondent shall have the right to 
be present at the hearing and all other stages of the 
proceedings.”103  A respondent was also for the first time 
specifically “be allowed to (i)  [c]ompel the attendance of witnesses; 
(ii) [p]resent evidence; and (iii) [c]onfront and cross examine 
witnesses.”104  The 1992 Act also provided that the standard of 
proof to be utilized in determining whether a guardian should be 
appointed is that of “clear and convincing evidence” and that “[t]he 
Rhode Island rules of evidence shall apply.”105 
The 1992 Act also introduced another new section to the 
guardianship statute, mandating the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem in every petition for the appointment of a guardian.106  
The guardian ad litem was to have both an investigatory and 
reporting function. Regarding her investigation, the guardian ad 
litem had four statutory duties: 
(1) Personally visiting the respondent; 
(2) Explaining to the respondent the nature, purpose, and 
legal effect of the appointment of a guardian; 
 
 99.  § 33-15-17.1(b); 1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1967. 
 100.  § 33-15-17.1(C); 1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1968. 
 101.  § 33-15-17.1(D); 1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1968. 
 102.  1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1978. 
 103.  Id. at 1979. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
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(3) Explaining to the respondent the hearing procedure, 
including, but not limited to, the right to contest the 
petition, to request limits on the guardian’s powers, to 
object to a particular person being appointed guardian, to 
be present at the hearing and to be represented by legal 
counsel; 
(4) Informing the respondent of the name of the person 
known to be seeking appointment as guardian.107 
Following her investigation, Rhode Island General Law 
section 33-15-7(c) requires the guardian ad litem to make the 
following determinations:  
(i) Whether the respondent wishes to be present at the 
hearing. 
(ii) Whether the respondent wishes to contest the 
petition. 
(iii) Whether the respondent wishes limits placed on the 
guardian’s powers; 
(iv) Whether the respondent objects to a particular person 
being appointed guardian, and; 
(v) Whether the respondent wishes to be represented by 
legal counsel.108 
After doing so, the guardian ad litem is then required to “inform[] 
the court of those determinations.”109  
If the respondent wishes to exercise any of these rights, she 
may be represented by legal counsel.110  If she does not secure her 
own counsel, the court will appoint legal counsel and, if necessary, 
bear the cost of securing the counsel.111 
A key feature of the 1992 Act was to recognize that not only 
do individuals have different levels of decision making capacity, 
but also such capacity may change over time for a particular 
individual.  Specifically, the 1992 Act provided that “[i]f, because 
 
 107.  Id. at 1980. 
 108.  33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-7(b)(7) (West 2006); see also 1992 R.I. Pub. 
Laws 1980-81. 
 109.   Id.   
 110.  1992 R.I. Pub. Laws 1981. 
 111.  Id. 
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of a change in the partially incapacitated individual’s level of 
decision making ability, the scope and duties of the limited 
guardianship order no longer meet the needs of the individual 
and/or fail to afford the individual as much autonomy as possible, 
modification of the limited guardianship order is required.”112 
The 1992 Act provided that such “[m]odification can be 
accomplished by agreement of the partially incapacitated 
individual, his or her counsel, if any and the limited guardian.”113  
If such agreement is reached, the statute provided that a proposed 
consent order would be prepared and submitted to the court.114  
However, if agreement could not be reached on such consent order, 
any of the parties—including the individual who was the subject 
of the guardianship—may request a hearing on such a proposed 
modification of the guardianship order.115 
The potential for modification was to be enhanced by the 
addition in the 1992 Act of the requirement of an “annual status 
report.”116  The statute also mandated the specific elements of 
such an annual status report to be the following: 
(1) The residence of the ward; 
(2) The condition of the ward; 
(3) Any changes the limited guardian [or] guardian 
perceives in the decision making capacity of the ward; 
and 
(4) A summary of actions taken and decisions made on 
behalf of the ward by the limited guardian or guardian.117 
C. 1994 Act 
 Of the stunning changes effected by the 1992 Act to Rhode 
Island’s guardianship laws, the one having the most impact on 
practice in probate courts was the replacement of the requirement 
of the (usually one page) physician’s letter with a seventeen-page 
FAT.  Although required to be submitted to the court along with 
the petition for guardianship, the FAT was not required to be 
 
 112.  Id. at 1978. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 1981. 
 117.  Id. 
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completed by a physician; rather, it could be completed by “any 
professional whose training and experience aid in the assessment 
of functional capacity.”118 
The Guardianship Commission continued its work, focusing 
on potential modifications to the 1992 Act needed in order to 
enable these reforms to work most effectively in practice.119  The 
Commission found that because of its length and complexity, the 
FAT was often difficult to complete, particularly by physicians.  In 
addition, the then serving Probate Judge of Providence, who also 
served on the Guardianship Commission, expressed the view that 
evidence supplied by a physician was of a unique reliability to a 
probate court. 
The continuing work of the Guardianship Commission 
resulted in the enactment by the General Assembly of 1994 R.I. 
Pub. Laws Ch. 359 (the “1994 Act”).  The major impact of the 1994 
Act was a six-page Decision-Making Assessment Tool (DMAT) to 
replace the seventeen-page FAT.120  In addition to its virtue of 
relative brevity, the DMAT focused on the extent to which an 
individual possesses decision-making capacity.121  The 1994 Act 
also provided that, while additional DMATs could be completed 
and submitted to a probate court for consideration, “[t]he 
individual’s treating physician must complete the decision-making 
assessment tool.”122 
The 1994 Act contained other modifications to statutory 
provisions revised by the 1992 Act which the Guardianship 
Commission found to be friction points in the effective 
implementation to reforms desired by the General Assembly in the 
1992 Act.  Specifically, in order to avoid delays in guardianship 
hearings, the 1994 Act mandated that the probate courts appoint 
a guardian ad litem simultaneous with the acceptance by the 
court of the petition for guardianship.123  Similarly, in order to 
prevent disparate forms of annual status reports, the 1994 Act 
 
 118.  Id. at 1979. 
 119.  The author, in his capacity as a then State Representative, in 1993 
became Chairman of the Guardianship Commission. 
 120.  1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1446. 
 121.  1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1445. 
 122.  1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1446. 
 123.  1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1447. 
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created a statutory form of annual status report.124  Finally, the 
1994 Act deleted the requirement of mail notice of the pendency of 
a guardianship petition to be provided to “any current provider of 
primary support services and primary medical caregivers” 
mandated by the 1992 Act, inserting instead that such notice be 
given to “any individual or entity known or reasonably known to 
the petitioner to be regularly providing protective services to the 
respondent.”125 
C. Conservatorships   
The reforms begun with the 1992 Act introduced to Rhode 
Island’s guardianship statutes requirements such as a formal 
assessment of individual’s functional ability by a physician who 
had examined the respondent, the potential for evidentiary 
hearings and other features designed to protect the procedural 
rights of respondents, and the appointment of a guardian ad litem. 
But what if an individual herself wished to have the 
supervision of a probate court in the management of her financial 
affairs?  However benign the intention of the initiation of a 
guardianship petition, with the reforms of 1992 Act the procedure 
to initiate and establish a guardianship became necessarily 
adversarial—a petitioner and respondent, service of process, etc. 
Such mechanisms would be unnecessary and add expense and 
potential delay for someone who voluntarily wished to have a 
third party, under the jurisdiction of a probate court, manage her 
finances. 
But why would a person subject herself to oversight of her 
financial affairs by a probate court?  Why not simply appoint 
someone to act as agent under a durable financial power of 
attorney?  One reason might be that the person whom the 
individual has selected as her fiduciary is only willing to serve in 
that capacity with the imprimatur and supervision of a court, 
perhaps due to a contentious family circumstance.  Another is that 
the establishment of certain special needs trusts under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396(d)(4)(A) requires the involvement of a court.  A 
conservatorship enables the individual to seek the involvement of 
a probate court without the inherently adversarial and more 
 
 124.  1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1449. 
 125.  Id. 
HEFFNER_FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2016  7:01 PM 
2016] GUARDIANSHIP LAW IN RHODE ISLAND 581 
expensive procedure of a guardianship proceeding. 
The Guardianship Commission found that such the 
mechanism for such a tailored and less restrictive procedure 
already existed in Chapter 15 of Title 33—specifically in Section 
44 allowing a probate court to appoint a conservator for an 
individual.  As noted above, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
pointed out that that the terms conservator and guardian of the 
estate are essentially synonymous.126  To the utility further noted 
by the Whitmarsh Court in 1959 of a conservatorship versus a 
guardianship proceeding in preserving personal dignity127 is now 
added avoiding the expense and formality resulting from the 
reforms to a guardianship proceeding.  The Guardianship 
Commission, and ultimately the General Assembly, finding such a 
tailored and less restrictive already in place in the statute, elected 
to leave Rhode Island General Law section 33-15-44 intact to 
serve this function.128 
D. Probate Uniformity Act of 1996 
Section 1 of 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws chapter 110 provided as 
follows: 
The General Assembly finds that due to the aging of 
Rhode Island’s population and other societal demands, 
 
 126.  Whitmarsh v. McGair, 156 A.2d 83, 87 (R.I. 1959). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-44 (West 2006).  The statute also enables 
“one or more of his or her relatives or friends” to initiate a conservatorship 
petition.”  Id.  In view of the sweeping due process protections for a 
respondent in a guardianship proceeding, such as enhanced notice and 
hearing rights, as well as the requirement of a DMAT and the report of a 
guardian ad litem, it is illogical to conclude that the Guardianship 
Commission and the General Assembly intended to create an “end run” via a 
conservatorship for such “relatives or friends” to petition a probate court to 
take over management of a person’s financial affairs absent her overt 
consent.  Id.  Rather, given the extensiveness of the legislation which arose 
from the Guardianship Commission’s deliberations and which was enacted by 
the General Assembly, both the Guardianship Commission and General 
Assembly, having concluded that a mechanism for an individual to initiate 
her own petition for a probate court-appointed and supervised fiduciary to 
manage her estate should remain, did not dive deeply into the language of § 
33-15-44 to discover this “relatives or friends” language.  In short, the 
retention of this phrase was an understandable oversight by the 
Guardianship Commission and the General Assembly in the midst of a 
virtual re-writing of the procedure for the initiation of guardianships. 
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increased demands have been placed on the probate 
courts of each city and town.  Accordingly, in order to 
provide further guidance to the statutorily created courts 
to assist them in the prompt and efficient administration 
of decedent’s and guardianship estates, the General 
Assembly has enacted the following revisions to sections 
of the Rhode Island General Laws dealing with probate 
jurisdiction, practice and appeals.  These revisions will be 
known as the Probate Uniformity Act of 1996.129 
As indicated by that preamble, the Probate Uniformity Act of 
1996 (the “1996 Act”)—in contrast to the 1992 and 1994 Acts, 
which dealt exclusively with guardianships—dealt with other 
chapters of Title 33 of the General Laws, as well as Chapter 8 of 
Title 9 pertaining to probate courts.  Nevertheless, the 1996 Act 
included significant modification to provisions of Chapter 15 of 
Title 33, pertaining to guardianships. 
The first of these was a requirement that the DMAT be 
completed by “a physician who has examined the respondent.”130  
The investigatory duties of the guardian ad litem were also 
expanded by the 1996 Act to include the requirement that the 
guardian ad litem “[r]eview the decision/assessment making 
tool(s), petition for guardianship/limited guardianship, and the 
notice,” as well as [i]nterview “the prospective guardian by 
telephone or in person.”131  The guardian ad litem’s reporting 
duties to the probate court were also expanded to include a 
determination as to “[w]hether the respondent wishes to be 
represented by legal counsel.”132 
In order to avoid the problem that had developed of guardian 
ad litem reports appearing on the same date as the hearing on the 
guardianship petition, the 1996 Act added the requirement that 
“[u]nless waived by the court, at least three (3) days prior to the 
hearing, the guardian ad litem shall file a report substantially in 
the form as set forth in section 33-15-47 with the court and shall 
mail or hand-deliver a copy to each attorney of record.”133 
In order to ensure a forum for ongoing study and development 
 
 129.  1996 R.I. PUB. LAWS 560. 
 130.  1996 R.I. PUB. LAWS 572. 
 131.  1996 R.I. PUB. LAWS 574. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
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of proposed legislation to continue the modernization of Rhode 
Island’s probate laws, the 1996 Act included a statutorily created 
commission for that purpose. This commission, officially titled “A 
Legislative Commission to Study the Feasibility of Modernizing 
Probate Law and Procedure and to Make Recommendations 
Therefor,”134 has become known as the “Probate Commission.” 
IV. AFTER THE DAWN 1997–2015 
The assimilation by courts and practitioners of the virtual re-
writing of Rhode Island’s guardianship laws by the General 
Assembly in the 1992 Act, begun with the 1994 and 1996 
legislation continued thereafter, the statutory sections of Chapter 
15 receiving the most attention were two of those first introduced 
in 1992 and 1994—those involving the DMAT and guardians ad 
litem. 
DMAT. As a result of the experience by courts, particularly in 
contested guardianships, the requirements for the physician 
completing the DMAT, revised in 1996 Act, was again revised in 
2004.135  In 2004, the General Assembly deleted the adjective 
“treating,” inserting instead “primary care” in describing the 
physician required to complete the DMAT, providing further “if 
the individual’s primary care physician is not available or if the 
individual does not have a primary care physician the decision-
making assessment tool must be completed by a physician who 
has examined the individual.”136 
The General Assembly in 2004 also made a limited exception 
to the mandate, introduced in the 1992 Act and continuing 
thereafter, that a DMAT must be filed with any guardianship 
petition.  Specifically, “the probate court may excuse the filing of a 
decision-making assessment tool only on a petition for temporary 
guardianship in extraordinary or emergency circumstances and 
upon the provision of other competent evidence.”137 
In 2007, the General Assembly again revisited which 
physician should be required to complete the DMAT.  In 
consolidating the notions of both the primary care physician and a 
 
 134.  1996 R.I. PUB. LAWS 604. 
 135.  See 2004 R.I. PUB. LAWS 2677. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
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physician who had treated the respondent, Rhode Island General 
Law section 33-15-4(a) was again modified to provide that a 
DMAT “must be completed by the respondent’s primary care 
physician, if one exists and is available, otherwise by a physician 
who has examined and treated the respondent.”138 
A. Guardians ad litem   
Given the novelty of the mandated use of guardians ad litem 
in each guardianship proceeding, it is not surprising that there 
developed wide variations in the reports of guardians ad litem, the 
method of their selection by the probate court, fees charged, and 
perhaps most significantly the views of the individuals tasked 
with performing this function of their roles in the proceedings. 
In 2007, the General Assembly added the requirement that 
any individual selected to serve as a guardian ad litem “shall have 
sufficient experience and/or training in dealing with elderly 
persons and persons with incapacities and/or disabilities and 
understanding of his or her role as guardian ad litem to be able to 
properly discharge such duties.”139  Each probate court was also 
mandated to “maintain a list of persons deemed qualified to serve 
as a guardian ad litem and shall appoint from that list on a 
rotating basis.”140 
The General Assembly also addressed a problem that had 
developed in certain instances when guardians ad litem became 
confused as to their roles.  Specifically, some guardians ad litem 
viewed themselves as advocates for the respondent, rather than as 
agents of the court whose duties culminate in a report submitted 
to the court, and would occasionally seek to continue their 
involvement in the case by morphing into counsel for the 
respondent or even guardian.  The 2007 legislature made clear 
that the identity of a guardian ad litem and that of potential 
counsel for a respondent were distinct by stating that “[a]ny 
guardian ad litem appointed for a respondent shall be ineligible to 
serve as legal counsel, temporary guardian or permanent 
guardian for that respondent.”141 
 
 138.  2007 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1760. 
 139.  2007 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1762. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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The intended limitation of the guardian ad litem to an 
investigatory and reporting role was further made clear in the 
2007 legislation by addition of new subsection (g) to Rhode Island 
General Law section 33-15-7(g).  This subsection provides that 
“[t]he guardian ad litem shall not interfere with interested parties 
and their counsel in gathering and presenting evidence according 
to court orders and rules of discovery and evidence.”142  Section 
33-15-7(g) further provides that “[t]he guardian ad litem may be 
called and confronted as a witness regarding his or her 
conclusions as submitted by report and the extent of his or her 
personal knowledge concerning the respondent.”143 
Finally, the 2007 legislation adopted in statute the practice of 
many probate courts, adding a new subsection (h) to section 33-15-
7, setting a cap of $400 on the fees of a guardian ad litem, while 
providing that “[t]he court has discretion to award guardian ad 
litem fees in excess of the cap if the circumstances warrant.”144 
B. Probate Commission  
The Probate Commission authorized by the 1996 Act was 
formed and became active shortly thereafter.145  For example, the 
2004 and 2007 legislation referenced above were derived from 
deliberations of the Probate Commission. 
In 2014, the Probate Commission studied the legislation 
which sought to enact the Uniform Adult Guardianship and 
Protection Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (UAGPPJA).146  While 
laudable in its goal of dealing with issues arising when more than 
one jurisdiction is involved in the guardianship of an individual, 
like most uniform acts, the UAGPPJA required tailoring to 
operate effectively within a particular jurisdiction—in this case, 
Rhode Island and its probate courts. 
On April 1, 2014, the Probate Commission adopted several 
proposed revisions to the Senate version of the UAGPPJA 
legislation, including reaffirming that the existing jurisdictional 
 
 142.  2007 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1763. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  The author, in his capacity as a then State Representative, served as 
the first Chair of the Probate Commission, and subsequently, including to the 
writing of this article, as its Vice-Chair. 
 146.  S. 2548 (R.I. 2014); H.R. 7687 (R.I. 2014). 
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basis of a Rhode Island probate court to appoint a guardian would 
remain intact.  The General Assembly, considering the Probate 
Commission’s recommendations, adopted a modified version of the 
UAGPPJA the following year.147 
CONCLUSION 
The lack of any major legislation since 1996 may be perceived 
as a reflection of a “mission accomplished.”  That is, after the 
virtual gutting of the existing substantive and procedural 
requirements for instituting and administering guardianships in 
Rhode Island which occurred in the mid-1980’s through the mid-
1990’s, and after the necessary fine tuning which occurred in the 
approximately ten year period thereafter, Rhode Island’s 
guardianship laws can be perceived by some as having largely 
effected the goal of the reformers. 
Another view is that lack of further substantial changes to 
Rhode Island’s guardianship’s laws is the result of complacency.  
For example, since the Wingspread conference in 1988, whose 
recommendations inspired and informed the reforms of the 1992 
Act, the National Guardianship Conference has convened again 
twice, in each instance producing further recommendations.148  In 
addition, the National Guardianship Association (NGA), which 
adopted the first NGA Standards of Practice for Guardians in 
2000, has produced new editions of its Standards of Practice in 
2003, 2007, and in 2013.149 
As evidenced by the diversity of members of the Guardianship 
Commission formed by the General Assembly in 1990, in order to 
be effective reform of guardianship laws must take into account 
the views of a number and a diversity of stakeholders.  Reform is a 
challenging and arduous process requiring significant political will 
and energy.  And such will and energy in turn often require a 
crisis atmosphere, like that sparked by the AP reports which was 
the catalysis for the Wingspread Conference, which in turn 
informed the work of the Guardianship Commission in creating, 
 
 147.  2015 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1160, 1254. 
 148.  See Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and 
Recommendations, 3 UTAH L. REV. 1191 (2012); Wingspan—The Second 
National Guardianship Conference, Recommendations, 31 STETSON L. REV. 
595 (2001). 
 149.  STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, 2 (NAT. GUARDIANSHIP ASSOC. 2013). 
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and the General Assembly in enacting the 1992 Act. 
Certainly reports of serious abuse and neglect in 
guardianship proceedings arise periodically in Rhode Island, as 
they do on in other states.  However, without a critical mass of 
such cases or analogue to the AP report, it is unlikely that the 
political will which resulted in the systemic reforms of the 1992 
Act will be mustered.  For many who consider reforms of the early 
1990s, with their continual review by the Probate Commission and 
periodic revisions by the General Assembly, to be adequate, this is 
a positive.  For those who believe that a more systemic change is 
again needed, it is not. 
 
